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∂AIL Commentary↓165 E. 56th St.↓New York, N.Y. 10022∞
To the Editor:

	Mr. xx should not despair about his proposed %2Afrikanerstan%1
in which the South African whites will do their own labor;
that is how it will end.  But how long
will it take, and how much blood will be spilled before
that solution is reached?  Most likely, a long time and much blood.

	The following considerations seem relevant:
.item←0

	#. The South African whites, especially the Afrikaners,
will not give up their dependence on the labor of blacks, who are
under their control and earn less than they do, until it becomes
clear to them that their comfortable way of life will become
impossible.

	#. We cannot now know how far ahead the South African
whites will be able to see.  Maybe their way of life must collapse
and efforts to restore it must fail, and maybe they will change
far in advance of an actual collapse.

	#. There is great potential enthusiasm for war against
South Africa among many young South African blacks, among South
Africa's neighbors, in the communist countries, in the U.N., and
among American liberals.  This enthusiasm imagines a war like that
in Vietnam or Algeria and doesn't see any difference arising from
the fact that the white South Africans have nowhere to retreat.
Many hope that a Rhodesian-type internal settlement can be reached
in which the whites will give up their military power and rely on the blacks
to keep an agreement that many black leaders will denounce.
Such an agreement seems extremely unlikely in the case of South
Africa.

	#. It is very unlikely that the South African whites will
allow themselves to be wiped out or forced into mass emigration
short of nuclear war.

	#. The present situation would become untenable very fast
if the black
standard of living outside South Africa equalled or surpassed
the black standard of living within South Africa.  It would also
move faster if the black African countries offered more personal
freedom.  It is possible that the white South Africans will not
be forced to change until this comes about.  The comparative
prosperity of black South Africans has hampered the revolutionary
movement just as the comparative prosperity of Israeli Arabs has
hampered the development of anti-Israel activity among them.

	#. However, under present world intellectual conditions, it is
unlikely that considerations of prosperity will be decisive enough to
prevent war.  Young people can be mobilized to fight domination by another
culture even when it is quite likely that the result of winning will be
widespread destruction, death, poverty and oppression by their own
leaders.

	#. After sufficient death and destruction, a partition of
South Africa will occur.  The best result would be for everyone to
see this in advance and reach this outcome without war.  The
whites would have to give up exploiting black labor, the blacks
would have to give up revenge, and the world liberal community
and the communist world
would have to give up another vicarious war of liberation.

	#. The South African blacks are more likely to
give up revenge than the outsiders to give up the vicarious
war of liberation.  At least, this is what the outside
reaction to the Rhodesian internal settlement seems to suggest.

	#. The probability of avoiding war or minimizing its destructiveness
would be enhanced if there were a mediator.  The function of a mediator
is to carry the perceptions of each side to the other and to reach
a settlement both sides will prefer to continued conflict.  A good
mediator suppresses his own ideas of what the settlement should be.

	#. At present there is no mediator.  For the present, the
United States has more to gain from siding with the African
countries than from promoting peace.  Moreover, mediation is probably
premature.  The whites are still physically comfortable, and the
blacks are still developing organization and power.  It seems unlikely
that any of their leaders can make peace on their behalf until
that power peaks and its limitations become apparent.
The chances will be better when a generation of black leaders, raised
on guerilla warfare, reaches an age that is willing to compare the
relative advantages of compromise and further fighting.

	Given these facts, what can be done?  Not much for the present.
There needs to be a peace movement concerned with the danger of
pressing any nuclear power to the wall - not just a communist nuclear
power.  The more people who understand that compromise must eventually
occur, the less likely is a nuclear war.

	In conclusion, I must confess that I see partition of South
Africa as morally preferable to the present exploitation
or to driving out the whites.  Once I was a vicarious supporter of
wars of liberation, but this changed when I saw how badly successful
liberators invariably behave.

.sgn